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11

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
D. CLARK WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

15313

MERRILL L. OLDROYD, GERALD CARTER
and JOHN A. CANTO,
)

Defendants and Appellants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages in trespass and to
quiet title to certain real property located in Utah
County, Utah.

Defendants denied generally and counter-

claimed to quiet title to said property in defendant
Gerald Carter, seeking reformation of certain deeds on
the alleged bases of mutual mistake and boundary by acquiescence.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen,
District Judge.

By stipulation in open court, the action

was dismissed against defendant Merrill L. Oldroyd.

On

February 14, 1977, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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were made and judgment entered against the remaining defer,dants.

Defendants then filed a Motion to Amend Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law or, in the Alternative,
for a New Trial.

This motion was denied on June 13, 1977,

and defendants Gerald Carter and John A. Canto have appeak
from the entry of judgment and denial of the motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts set out in appellants' brief, although come
in most respects, are incomplete in that they fail to set
out all material evidence presented at trial.

Such failuu

creates a serious problem, since this appeal is essentially an attack upon the sufficiency of evidence to suppor:
findings made by the trial court.

A great portion of ilie

testimony adduced at trial was vigorously disputed.

In ore,

to enable this court to determine whether the trial court
had sufficient evidence to find as it did, a more complete
summary of the evidence must be provided.

Accordingly,

respondent presents the following Statement of Facts:
This dispute concerns a parcel of real property located north of U.S. Highway 50-6 in Spanish Fork Canyon.
Respondent D. Clark Williams was raised on the property
now in dispute, it being the old family homestead (Tr.
In 1935, Williams gained title to a substantial amount
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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0'

acreage in the area, including the disputed property and
surrounding land (Tr. SO).

From that time until the

present, he has paid all taxes on the property in dispute (Tr. 51).

On May 22, 1954, Williams conveyed a por-

tion of his property to himself, Clifton Huff and Dennis L.
Prince, a partnership doing business as Skyline Enterprises
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 12).

Williams retained property ad-

joining the "Skyline" property on the north and east.
This retained property included land on both sides of
Tie Fork Creek, which runs roughly parallel to the eastern
Skyline boundary.
The deed conveying the Skyline property describes
it as a rectangular parcel 300 feet deep and 1,560 feet
long, bordering the northerly edge of U.S. Highway 50-6.
Unbeknown to anyone for over 20 years, the deed description contained a latent ambiguity in that the initial rnetesand-bounds call conflicts with the call to the highway
(Tr. 7, 10, 13, 21, etc.).

This ambiguity was discovered

in 1974, when Williams commissioned a survey by Engineering
Associates (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16).

Following the gen-

erally accepted survey assumption that a call to a fixed
monument (in this case, the highway) prevails over a conflicting metes-and-bounds call, Engineering Associates
set the point of beginning in the northerly highway line
and thereby established the boundary line.

The survey

showed that the easterly Skyline boundary lies approxi-
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mately 100 feet west of Tie Fork Creek (Tr. 19) and that
the northerly boundary lies 300 feet north of and parallel
to the highway.
A map (Defendants' Exhibit 21) prepared for appellanb
by Surveying Associates, Inc., graphically illustrates the
deed discrepancy and the area in dispute, and it is reprol"_
herein as Appendix 1. The map shows the actual deed description in red lines, the description as adjusted by EngineerL
Associates in blue lines, and the area claimed by appellants
in yellow lines (the easterly yellow line following Tie ForCreek) .

The disputed area has been shaded in yellow for

illustrative purposes.
Following the May 22, 1954 conveyance, Skyline
Enterprises built a motel, service station and cafe on its
property.

Williams, who was an active member of the partne:-

ship and a principal stockholder and president of the partr.i
ship's successor corporation, Skyview Enterprises, Inc.
(Tr. 112), testified that Skyline Enterprises never occupied the area now in dispute (Tr. 113), and the record is
devoid of evidence that Skyline Enterprises, rather than
Williams himself, as owner of the adjoining land, allowed
anyone to go upon the disputed area.
Following the 1954 conveyance, in addition to paying
property taxes, Williams made the following uses of the
disputed area:
(a)

He granted a pole line easement to Utah Power
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& Light Company in August 1954 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 44);
(b)

In a conveyance of certain other lands to the

Spanish Fork Livestock Association in 1961 (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1), he expressly excepted therefrom the property
conveyed to Skyline Enterprises, and in addition, retained " ... all that land within the premises between the
northerly boundary of U.S. Highway 50-6, and the southerly
boundary of D&RGW Railroad ... ," viz., the disputed property;
(c)

He parked in the disputed area while deer

hunting (Tr. 90)

and held a family reunion on the pro-

perty (Tr. 97);
(d)

He planted crested wheatgrass and other grasses

(Tr. 149); and
(e)

He obtained a permit in 1973 to clean, repair

or deepen an existing well (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20), in
order to build a summer home and ready the land for developers

(Tr. 48-49).

In 1961, Dr. Merrill Oldroyd, a defendant in the
original action, purchased stock in Skyview Enterprises,
Inc., which now owned the Skyline property.

Oldroyd

testified at trial that before he bought into the
corporation, \villiams represented to him that the Skyline
boundaries were as represented by the yellow lines in
Appendix 1, i.e., along Tie Fork Creek to the east and
the D&RGW Railroad right-of-way to the north, inter alia
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(Tr.

238239) .

representations

Williams flatly denied having made these
(Tr. 119).

Subsequently, Dr. Oldroyd and his family became the
owners of all the stock of Skyview Enterprises, Inc.
(Tr. 119-220, 239); and on July 16, 1963, the corporation
entered into a contract to sell the Skyline property to
Lloyd Horlacher and Elda Horlacher.

According to the Horlac

testimony, Williams made boundary representations to them
which were identical to those he had allegedly made to
Oldroyd (Tr. 207, 215, 261).

Again, Williams stoutly denie,

ever having made the representations (Tr. 121, 122).
At the time the Horlachers went into possession,
Williams moved to Salt Lake City and did not return to the
property until 1970 (Tr. 122, 124).

During the interim,

the Horlachers placed trailer hookups precisely along the
easterly deed boundary and north into the disputed area,
cleared some brush from the disputed area, placed a

coup~

of outhouses along the creek, and attempted to plant the
disputed area with lawn seed, which did not grow (Tr. 18,
217-21).

The Horlachers never notified Williams of these

infringements on his property (Tr. 220).
In 1966, Mrs. Hor lacker (since divorced)

assigned her

interest in the real estate contract to her son, appellant
Gerald Carter (Defendants' Exhibit 36).

Carter went inW

possession of the Skyline property at that time and re111a 1
on the property through the commencement of this action.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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When Williams returned to his property in 1970, he discovered that certain electrical hookups were in the disputed
area.

He told Carter that he, Carter, was trespassing and

requested that he remove the posts, all but one of which
were subsequently pulled out (Tr. 124).
In 1973 a dispute arose over the boundary between the
Skyline property and Williams' land.

At that time Williams

and Carter paced off the deed footage (Tr. 92).

Although

apparently agreeing that the Skyline property was 300 feet
deep, the parties disagreed concerning the easterly boundary, Williams arguing that it ran west of the creek (Tr.
93).

Carter then offered to buy the disputed property from

Williams (Tr. 93); in fact, Carter admitted at trial that he
offered to buy the disputed property from Williams on at
least two occasions (Tr. 309, 315).
In the summer of 1974, ignoring Williams' claim to the
property, and ignoring the footages which he and Williams
had paced off, Carter employed appellant Canto to grade the
disputed area, together with part of the Skyline property.
During the course of grading the Skyline property, but
before commencing work on the disputed land, Canto parked
his equipment in the disputed area.

Williams happened to

come by (although living in Spanish Fork, Tr. 43, he used the
property extensively for outings with his daughter, Tr. 105)
and told Canto that Canto's equipment and camp were on his
property.

Williams testified that had he known that Canto
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intended to tear up the property, he would have forbid hin
to begin work (Tr. 129).
Canto, following Carter's instructions, proceeded to
grade the disputed area in August 1974.

In the course of

grading, he totally removed the vegetation and topsoil (up
to 17 inches in places)

from the disputed area (Tr. 152 and

Plaintiff's Exhibit 22), altered the area's drainage into
the stream (Tr. 142), and buried a patch of willows at
streamside (Tr. 145)

As a result, undesirable weeds have

taken over (Tr. 159) and the stream has become polluted (Tr.
154)
On August 16, 1974, Williams discovered the damage wher.
he conunissioned the Engineering Associates survey (Tr. 94).
He inunediately commenced this lawsuit, seeking to quiet
title and recover damages in trespass.
At trial Williams presented evidence of damages on two
theories:
value.·

cost of restoration and diminution in market

To support his testimony, as landowner, concerning

the damage done by grading, Williams relied on expert test1·
many by Grant Williams, a land management expert, and

Esbe'~

Baadsgaard, a licensed real estate broker who presented
testimony concerning sales of similar parcels of land.
Appellants offered no rebuttal evidence on the issue of
damages.
Following trial, at which the action was dismissed
against defendant Oldroyd, the court ruled in favor of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pl3intiff \hlliams, quieting title to the disputed property
in \'Iilliams and granting him damages in the sum of $6,690.00,
representing the property's diminution in value as a result
of the trespass.

Defendants Carter and Canto have appealed

this ruling.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO REFORM THE
SUBJECT DEED AS REQUESTED BY APPELLANTS.
Appellants' first contention in seeking reversal is
that the trial court's refusal to reform the subject deed
was in error, because (1)
(2)

the deed description is erroneous;

the evidence shows that the parties to the original

(May 22, 1954) deed were mutually mistaken in giving and
taking an instrument containing an erroneous description,
and (3) Dr. Oldroyd, the Horlachers and Carter relied on
alleged boundary representations by Williams in occupying
the disputed area.
In analyzing appellants' contentions, it is important
to note four basic rules of appellate review to which this
court has staunchly adhered:

(1) that the appellate

court indulges the findings and judgment of the trial
court with a presumption of validity and correctness;
(2)

that the appellate court reviews the record in a light

favorable to those findings and judgment;

(3) that it does

not disturb the findings and judgment if they find substan-

-9-
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tial support in the evidence, and (4)

that it requires

appellant to sustain the burden of showing error.

R. C.

Tolman Const. Co. v. Myton Water Ass'n., 563 P.2d 780, 782
(Utah 1977) .
The rationale underlying this broad deference to the
trial court is explained in the leading deed reformation
case of Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571, 581
(1950) :
The trial court is in a more favorable situation to deal with many of the imponderables
arising in a trial of an action than we are.
We acknowledge his vantage point on such
things as demeanor and credibility and we
realize that the "live show" he watches is
far more effective in disclosing the ultimate truths than are the typewritten pages
of a transcript. We appreciate his better
opportunities for searching out inaccuracies,
untruths, exaggerations and concealed bias or
interest and if we are to fully accept his
advantageous position we must allow him
some latitude in giving weight to elements
we are unable to evaluate.
A review of the lengthy transcript of the instant case
reveals that nearly every material fact, except evidence
concerning damages, was disputed, especially with respect·
testimony concerning Williams' alleged boundary

represe~

tations to Dr. Oldroyd and the Horlachers (see, e.g., Tr.
119-22, 214, 238, 261).

Under such circumstances, this

c~

should not lightly substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.
After weighing the witnesses' conflicting testimony,
the trial court ruled as follows in its Memorandum Dec is•
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of January 27, 1977:

"The court does not find sufficient

facts to order reformation of the deed,

[emphasis

added]. The decision comports with the long-standing rule
in Utah that a deed will be reformed only upon a clear
and convincing showing, as opposed to a mere preponderance,
that the parties were mutually mistaken in the execution and
delivery of an instrument at variance with their intent, and
that the party seeking reformation has not been guilty of
neglect in the execution of the deed, or of laches in seeking
relief.

Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 P.2d 620

(1957), and cases cited therein.

The "clear and convincing"

standard is defined in Sine v. Harper, supra, as follows:
That proof is convincing which carries with
it, not only the power to persuade the mind
as to the probable truth or correctness of
the fact it purports to prove, but has the
element of clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing proof clinches
what might be otherwise only probable to
the mind.
22 P.2d at 581.
Appellants simply have not met this rigorous burden of
proof.
First, appellants argue that since the deed description is erroneous, it should be reformed along lines
corresponding to their alleged possession.

Granted, the

deed description contains a latent ambiguity [(i.e., one which
does not appear on the face of the instrument, but is shown to
exist when the description is applied to the property itself,
23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds,

§

251 (1965) ], in that although the par-

-11-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

eel described is obviously a rectangle 1, 560 feet long and
300 feet deep, the initial metes-and-bounds call conflicts
with the call to the northerly line of U.S. Highway 50-6.
Such an ambiguity does not, however, require the drastic
remedy of reformation.

Instead, the trial court chose

merely to rely on a basic rule of construction in cases
involving boundary disputes, i.e., that fixed monuments
(in this case, the highway)

take precedence over calls of

courses or distances.

Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 42!

P.2d 525, 527 (1966).

Following this rule, the court allow·

the boundary line to remain unchanged and did not, as appe:lants contend, ".
not reform."

. reform the deed which it said it woulc

(Appellants' Brief, 12)

Of course, had the court desired, it could have effected a reformation by following the survey description

re

tained in the Engineering Associates' survey commissioned
by Williams (see Surveyor's Certificate, Plaintiff's Exhib;;
That description is simply the original boundary line adjusted to give precedence to the call to U.S. Highway 50-6.
Such a boundary line--running west of Tie Fork Creek and
south of the railroad right-of-way--conforms precisely to:
mutual intent of the parties to the original deed.
Quibbling over a latently ambiguous deed description,
however, will not resolve this controversy.

As the

Surv~

Associates' survey (Defendants' Exhibit 21 and Appendix l
herein) clearly demonstrates, appellants claim a subston
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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amount of land (yellow lines on exhibit)

lying outside

both the original deed description (red lines) and the description as corrected to conform to the highway call (blue
lines) .
In a roundabout effort to substantiate their claim to
this unconveyed parcel, appellants argue (Appellants'
Brief, 12-13)

( 1) that following the original conveyance

from Williams to Skyline Enterprises, the partnership occupied
the disputed area, as did its successor corporation, Skyview
Enterprises, Inc.;

(2) that in 1960 or 1961,

~~illiams

induced

Dr. Oldroyd to buy into the corporation by representing the
boundaries to be as appellants claim; and (3) that Williams,
who no longer owned any interest in the Skyline property,
made similar representations to the Horlachers in 1963.

None

of these allegations, even if true, would rise to the level
of a pre-existing agreement between Williams, as grantor,
and himself and his associates, doing business as Skyline
Enterprises, as grantees.

For example, assuming arguendo

that deer hunters and construction workers were allowed to
park their vehicles and equipment in the disputed area in
the early Skyline days, as testified by Carter (Tr. 293),
the record contains no evidence that these uses were permitted by Skyline Enterprises, rather than by \'lilliams
as sole owner of the property.

A hypothetical example will

illustrate this point: Suppose deer hunters had approached
Williams while Williams was tending the Skyline gas station,
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and had received permission to camp on the disputed property.

Was the permission granted by Williams on behalf

of Skyline, or by lhlliarns as Skyline's neighbor and the
property's sole owner?

The record is inconclusive.

A more significant gap in the record is the absence o:
any of the original grantees, other than Williams, as witnesses at trial.

If appellants were truly serious about

seeking reformation on the basis of a pre-existing agreement, why did they fail to call Clifton Huff as a witness
(Dennis Price being deceased)?

After all, the issue in

reformation proceedings is what the parties to the instrument mutually intended, not what subsequent takers may spec
late years after the fact.

The trial court was bound to le

at the transaction as of the time of execution, 66 Am. Jur.;
Reformation of Instruments,

§

5 (1973); without any evidenc

relating to that point in time, the court could hardly be
expected to reform the deed on the basis of vague inferenc<
and self-serving reconstructions.
Moreover, appellants' attempt to reconstruct an inference of pre-existing agreement and mutual mistake is
dependent upon findings that Skyline Enterprises actually
did make the alleged boundary representations.

In fact,

however, each of those allegations was vehemently denied
by Williams at trial (Tr. 113, 119, 121-22) , and his deni:
was bolstered by appellant Carter's admission (Tr. 309,
that on at least two occasions, he attempted to buy the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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disputed property from Williams.
Apparently, Judge Sorensen chose to believe respondent
rather than appellants, as is shown by his Memorandum
Decision and by the court's Findings of Fact entered on
February 14, 1977, which stated, at paragraph 5:
There is no evidence to support a finding that
plaintiff and the partnership, dba Skyline
Enterprises, intended any boundary between
their lands other than [the deed boundary as
corrected by survey], nor is there sufficient
evidence to support a finding that Skyline
Enterprises occupied, possessed or claimed
any of the lands lying north or east of said
boundary.
The above finding is exactly contrary to the facts
selected by appellants, and appellants must rebut that
finding in order to obtain a reversal on appeal.

Their

position in this respect is identical to that of the appellants in First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co.,
27 Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971), in which the court stated,
492 P.2d at 133:
Where the appellant's position is that the
trial court erred in refusing to make certain
findings essential to its right to recover,
and insists that the evidence compels such
findings, it is obliged to show that there
is credible and uncontradicted evidence which
proves those contended facts with such certainty that all reasonable minds must so
find.
Conversely, if there is any reasonable
basis, either in the evidence or from the
Iaekof evidence upon which reasonable minds
might conclude that they are not so convinced
by a preponderance of the evidence, then the
findings should not be overturned [Emphasis
addeo J.
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Not one of appellants' asserted facts is undisputed in
record; to the contrary, it is evident that Judge

Sorens~

had a reasonable basis in evidence for his finding that
there was no pre-existing boundary agreement at variance
with the original deed.
Finally, even if this court were to accept appellant''
view of the facts respecting boundary representations and
occupation of the disputed area, appellants should nontheless be denied reformation because Oldroyd, the Hor lac hers
and Carter were all inexcusably negligent in taking their
respective property interests without questioning the

ob~:

discrepancy between the alleged representations and the de,
descriptions.

A glance at any of the instruments sought'.

be reformed reveals that the property is a perfect rectans
1, 560 feet long and 300 feet deep bordering on the highway·
not the irregularly-shaped chunk which appellants claim wa,
represented to be their property by Williams.

Nonetheless

Oldroyd took a deed from Skyview Enterprises, Inc., beari:
the identical description as the initial deed; Oldroyd
entered into a real estate contract with the Horlachers
for the same described property; and the Horlachers assi~
their interest to Carter using the same description--and
not one of these people ever bothered to read the

instr~

he took (Tr. 226, 242, 255), to discuss the matter sericwith Williams, to commission a survey, or even to pace
the deed footages.
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Under Utah law, the issue of inexcusable negligence
as a defence to reformation is a question of fact to be
decided on a case-by-case basis.
122 Utah 96, 246 P.2d 866

(1952).

Petersen v. Eldredge,
As a general rule, however,

a finding of inexcusable neglect requires (1) breach of
legal duty by the party seeking reformation,
prejudice to the other party.

(2) causing

McMahon v. Tanner, 122 Utah

333, 249 P.2d 502 (1952); see generally Annot., 81 A.L.R. 2d
7, 31-32 (1962).

It is evident that Dr. Oldroyd's failure

to correct the alleged descriptional error when he contracted
with the Horlachers was a breach of his duty to convey clear
title.

Furthermore, Williams has been prejudiced by the breach

of duty in that it ultimately resulted in the trespass which
impelled this lawsuit.
The conduct of Oldroyd, the Horlachers and Carter with
respect to the conveyances in question suggests only two
possible conclusions: either they were inexcusably negligent
in taking erroneous instruments, or they received exactly
what they paid for.

In either case, the trial court's de-

cision should be affirmed and reformation denied.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO QUIET TITLE
TO THE DISPUTED PROPERTY IN APPELLANTS ON THE
BASIS OF ACQUISITION BY ACQUIESCENCE
It has been long recognized in Utah that when the true
boundary bPtween adjoining tracts of land is unknown, unC'c'l ta

in or in dispute, the respective owners may by parol
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agreement establish the boundary line and thereby ir-rE'voc 0
bind themselves and their grantees.
Milliner,

See, e.g., Brown v.

120 Utah 2d 16, 232 P.2d 202

claim that Williams'

(1951).

Appellants

alleged boundary representations to

Oldroyd and the Horlachers constituted such a pu.rol agreement,

thereby establishing the claimed boundary.
Of course, as recently reaffirmed by this court in

Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corporation, 530 P.2d 792

(Utah

1975) , where the existence of such a boundary agreement is
t~

in dispute, a boundary may not be established solely on

basis of an oral agreement, as such an agreement may viola:
the Statute of Frauds.
257, 62 P. 893
Instead,

See also Strickley v. Hill, 22

u~

(1900).
the court has endorsed the common law doctri-

of boundary by acquiescence, whereby boundary disputes are
resolved through an orderly system of presumptions.

The

initial burden of proof lies with the party claiming bound
by acquiescence, who must prove four elements in order

~

raise a presumption that a boundary agreement exists.

Thi

elements are:

( 1)

occupation up to a visible line marked

definitely by monuments,

fences or buildings,

in the line as a boundary,
(4)
156,

( 3)

by adjoining land owners.
389 P. 2d 14 3 ( 1964) .

(2)

acquie~

for a long period of years
Fuoco v. l'lilliams,

15 Utah

If the claimant can thus estat-

lish the presumption of an agreement, the burden shifts
the other party to rebut the presumption by competent e'
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1

dence.

llov1ever, as emphasized by the court in Fuoco v.

\'lilliams, supra,
if the party claiming title by acquiescence
fails to carry his burden and raise the presumption, then there is no case at all.
389 P.2d
at 145.
The court must first, then, analyze each of appellants'
arguments in the light of the foregoing four elements.
First, appellants insist that beginning in May 1954,
Skyline Enterprises and later Skyview Enterprises, Inc.,
occupied the disputed area up to the claimed boundary.
However, as outlined in Point I of this brief, Williams
(who was a member of the Skyline Enterprise's partnership)
denied such occupation; and this court is bound to view
disputed facts in a light favorable to him, giving deference
to Judge Sorensen's Memorandum Decision, wherein he did not
find "sufficient believable facts to establish a boundary
Moreover, the record is de-

by acquiescense [sic].

void of evidence that Skyline Enterprises, rather than
Williams as Skyline's neighbor, occupied the property.
Absent evidence of occupation by Skyline and Skyview while
respondent had an interest in those entities, occupation
of the disputed area by appellant Carter's predecessors in
interest could not have begun earlier than 1963, when
Williams left the property.
Furthermore, the requisite occupation must border on
a visible line

~arked

definitely by monuments, fences or
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buildings.

Appellants claim that a fence along Tie Fork

Creek operated as such a visible line (Appellants' Brief,
24).

The record clearly illustrates, however, that the

fence was used to hold cattle and horses, rather than to
fix a boundary (Tr. 97, 1977).

Use of the fence for live-

stock control continued throughout the time that Williams'
brother and expert witness, Grant Williams, was on the
property (Tr. 176), a period extending from 1954 through
1967 (Tr. 166-167).

As emphasized in appellants' main

ca~

for the point, Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 727 (Utah 1974),
the period of time that a fence exists for livestock
purposes

cont~

. will not constitute part of the 'long peru

of time' requisite to establish a boundary by acquiescence.
Accordingly, the alleged occupation, if any, did not begin
until at least 1967.
Second, appellants fail to show the requisite
by respondent.

acquie~

Williams testified that he was unaware of:

encroachment by the Horlachers or Carter before 19 70, as hi
had left the property when the Horlachers took possession:
1963 (Tr. 122).

Without knowledge, he could not

acquies~

Irnrnedia tely upon returning, he told Carter that Carter was
trespassing by placing trailer hookups in the area now in
dispute (Tr. 124).

Later, when Canto parked his caterpill

in the area before grading the property, Williams told hithat he was camped on Williams' land (Tr. 129).
negate any allegation of acquiescence.
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These ,,.

0

Finally, appellants have failed to show acquiescence
in the line as a boundary for the required period of years.
Acquiescence, if any, began no earlier than 1963 (when
Skyview Enterprises, Inc. conveyed the property to the
Horlachers) and ended when lvilliams commenced this action,
a total of 11 years.

In a lengthy discussion of the period

of time required under boundary by acquiescence, this court,
in King v. Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 378 P.2d 893 (1963), pointed
out that as a general rule, the prescriptive period of twenty
years is the appropriate yardstick.

The court could find

only two decisions [one of which, Eckberg v. Bates, 121
Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 (1951), is heavily relied upon by
appellants] which had allowed a period of less than twenty
years to perfect title by acquiescence.

In both, the

circumstances indicated an ancient boundary obviously existing
for a period in excess of the prescriptive period.

The court

concluded as follows:
Boiled down, it seems to us that establishment of boundary by acquiescence may be predicated upon the existence of a visibly monumented
line persisting for at least twenty years or upwards, shown specially or circumstantially, in
order to meet or exceed the requirements of acquiring rights by prescription .
. The parade of cases to date calls on
equity to flex its muscles only to pull the
period below twenty years in the rarest of
cases involving the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence.
378 P.2d at 897.
The circumstances of the instant case, including the
absence of any ancient boundary, clearly do not justify
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shortening the acquiescence period to infer an agreement
which never, in fact, existed.
However, even if this court were to find that appellants have presented sufficient evidence to raise the presumption that a binding agreement existed, Williams' evide:.
provides a compelling rebuttal.

Between the time that he

conveyed his property to Skyline Enterprises and the time
he commenced this action, Williams paid all taxes on the
disputed property (Tr. 51), granted a pole line easement
over the disputed property to Utah Power & Light Company
(plaintiff's Exhibit 44), excluded both the Skyline

prope~

and the disputed property, separately, in a conveyance of
other lands to the Spanish Fork Livestock Association
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), parked in the disputed area (Tr.:
held a family reunion there (Tr. 97), planted the area (Tr.
149), and obtained a permit to clear an existing well one
property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 20) .

Plainly, Williams neve

acted in keeping with the alleged "agreement."

Neither,r

appears, did appellant Carter, who admitted that he attem:·
to buy the disputed property from Williams on at least
occasions (Tr. 309, 315).

t'.·:~

The irrestible conclusion is

that the attempt to prove boundary by acquiescence is mere
a recently-fabricated smoke screen for a naked trespass.

-22-
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAN.AGES TO RESPONDENT
WAS PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
The trial court awarded damages to Williams in the sum
of $6,690.00, on the basis that appellants' trespass had
reduced the fair market value of the land from $6,000.00
per acre to $3,000.00 per acre.

Williams' evidence of

damages at trial included his own estimate, as landowner,
of the property's value (Tr. 202); evidence of market value
by Esbern Baadsgaard, a licensed real estate broker (Tr. 18087); evidence of soil, plant and stream destruction by
\~illiams,

Grant

a forestry and land resources expert (Tr.

147-65); and evidence of topsoil replacement cost by Alfred
Johnson, a topsoil hauler (Tr. 58-59).

By contrast, appel-

lants offered only the testimony of appellant Canto, a catskinner, whose "professional opinion"

(Appellants' Brief, 30)

was that there was no difference in soil condition before
and after grading.

Absent any significant rebuttal testimony,

the trial court was bound to award damages on the basis of
the only evidence offered, viz., that of respondent Williams.
Appellants attack the court's damage award on three
bases.

First, they argue that Williams' testimony, that

the property was worth $6,000.00 per acre before the
trespass and half that afterwards (Tr. 202), was improperly
admitted, as it was unsupported by evidence of property
values or surrounding circumstances.

-23-

It should be noted
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that Williams' testimony was received without objection;•
therfore, its admission, even if erroneous, would not
constitute grounds for reversal.
Evidence (1971).

Rule 4, Utah Rules of

However, the admission of Williams' testi

mony was patently proper.

This court was repeatedly statec

that
. an owner of property is always entitled to
testify as to its value, and to express an opinion
as to its value in condemnation proceedings. An
owner does not have to qualify as an expert, nor
be engaged in buying and selling real estate.
Provo River Water Users Ass'n. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, lli

*The transcript reads as follows:

Q.

[by Mr. Fowler]
Do you have an opinion, Mr.
Clark [sic] as to the value of the disputed
property prior to the grading?

A.

Yes, it would be around -MR. NELSON: Just a minute. I object on the
ground that no sufficient foundation has been
laid.
It's been established, Your
MR. FOWLER:
Honor -THE COURT: Just a minute. He may answer.
I think under the law of this state the owner
of property can always testify to its value.
I don't think it's a good rule of law, Mr.
Fowler, but I think it is the law.
Do you
agree it is the law?
MR. NELSON:
I am not certain, Your Honor,
but will demur to your ruling (Tr. 202)

The record thus indicates that the initial objection was
withdrawn and not raised again, nor did appellants' counse.
move to strike the witness' answer.
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P.2cl 777, 782 (1943); see also Utah State Road Cow;i. v.
Johnson, 550 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976).

That the instant

case is not a condemnation case is irrelevant, as the court
in either instance is attempting to arrive at a basis for
awarding damages.
The above general rule has been limited somewhat by the
holdings in Utah State Road Comm. v. Johnson, supra, and
Utah State Road Comm. v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (Utah
1975), which ruled that a landowner's testimony lacks probative value if he is not particularly familiar with the
property (e.g., if he has come into ownership of property by
inheritance and has no realistic idea of its value).

The

limitations of these cases, however, are no impediment to
admissibility in the instant case.

Williams was raised on

the property (Tr. 44), established a business adjacent to
it (Tr. 109), and was intimately familiar with common uses
of the property and how those uses (primarily recreation)
were affected by the trespass (Tr. 106-106).

His testimony

thus carries great probative weight, and the court's award,
based thereon, should not be disturbed.*
Appellants next contend (Appellants' Brief, 28-29)

*It should be noted that Williams' appraisal was very modest
in comparison with that of his expert witness, Baadsgaard,
who placed the property's worth at $23,000.00 to $26,000.00
before the trespass (based on subdivision into four lots
worth $5,500.00 to $6,500.00 apiece, Tr. 183-85), and
$3,000.00 afterwards (Tr. 186).
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that the admission of evidence based on the property's
value as a potential

su~mer

home site was improper.

Appellants cite no authority for their proposition, which
is contrary to the prevailing rule, as stated in 22
2d, Damages,

§

133

Ara. J';:

(1965):

It is the qualities and attributes of the real
estate which affect its value. To the extent
that other uses of the land in question would
be more profitable, these other uses may be
considered by the court to the extent that
they affect the present value of that land.
This may be true even though plaintiff has
not taken advantage of that value.
Moreover, the record indicates that Williams had taken
initial steps to prepare the property for subdivision,
including obtaining a well permit (Tr. 104) and discussing
the possibilities of re-zoning with a local official
(Tr. 132).

Obviously, use of the property for summer home:

was being seriously contemplated.
Finally, appellants argue that since the Horlachers
and Carter improved the property before it was graded, the
damages should be reduced to reflect their efforts.

In

light of Williams' desire to build summer homes in a natur:
setting on the property, it is questionable whether putt~
in a trailer court and outhouses constituted "improvements
Moreover, appellants' argument fails to account for the
differences in soil and plant condition before and after·
trespass, as illustrated by the testimony and exhibits o'
Williams' expert witness, Grant Williams (Tr. 155); nor
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does it account for the extensive damage caused to the
stream bed, including alteration of the property's natural
drainage (Tr. 142), burying willows located at streamside
(Tr. 145), and, in Baadsgaard's words, giving the creek
the appearance of a ditch rather than a stream (Tr. 137)
In sum, Williams has not sought to take advantage of
improvements allegedly made by the Horlachers and appellant
Carter.

Instead, he has merely sought compensation for a

wrongful trespass which, although instigated by the Horlachers,
came to a head with the bulldozing done by Canto at Carter's
insistence, thereby converting property once ideal for
Williams' purposes into what is now essentially a desert
(Tr. 153).
If the court conunitted any error, it was in refusing
to award damages to Williams on the basis of restoration
cost, rather than diminution in value, evidence having been
submitted to support both theories.
The relative merits and appropriateness of these two
measures of damages received exLensive treatment in Brereton
v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 64, 433 P.2d 3 (1967), the court coneluding as follows, 433 P.2d at 5-6:
. . . [T]he injured party [should have] the benefit
of whichever of the two rules will best serve the
objective .
. of giving him reasonable and adequate
comoensation for his actual loss as related to
his.use of the property. This more flexible approach avoids a rigid application of either rule
where it would result in confering a favor on
the wrongJ00r at the expense of the victim; and
it allows the owner o~ the property which has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-27Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

been damaged the privilege which should be
his of having the decision as to how he desires
to use his property, by giving him the amount
of damage he suffers on the basis of that use.
If he wants to maintain a fruit orchard, a wood
lot, or even a primitive area, though his property may be more valuable if turned into an
industrial or residential purpose, that should
be his prerogative; and if it is wrongfully destroyed or damaged, the wrongdoer should pay
for the actual damage caused.
This pronouncement, al though dealing with injury to trees,
not the land its elf, adheres to the rule of the Restatemen'.
of Torts, Second, Section 929, which allows plaintiff to
elect, within certain limits, the measure of damages which
will most fully compensate him for a wrongful invasion of
his real property.

Section 929, comment b, is particular!

applicable to the instant case:
Even in the absence of value arising from personal use, the reasonable cost of replacing the
land in its original position is ordinarily
allowable as the measure of recovery. Thus,
where a ditch is dug without right upon the
land of another, the other normally is entitled
to damages measured by the expense of filling
the ditch, if he wishes it filled.
If, however,
the cost of replacing the land in its original
condition is disproportionate to the diminution
in the value of the land caused by the trespass,
unless there is a reason personal to the owner
for restoring the original condition, damages
are measured only by the difference between the
value of the land before and after the harm.
[Emphasis added]
It is evident that appellant had such a personal

re~

for restoring the property to its original condition,

na~

to make it a retirement retreat or a suitable site for
summer homes.

Replacement cost would thus appear to
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proper measure of damages.

The record indicates that a

representative restoration of topsoil would require approximately 2,450 tons (Tr. 164-65).

Alfred Johnson, a topsoil

hauler, testified that the cost of hauling topsoil would be
$50.00 per truckload (25 tons), plus $40.00 per trip for
truck service, based on mileage from Spring Lake (Tr. 5859).

A total of 98 trips would be required (Tr. 165).

Thus, replacement cost, exclusive of costs of spreading the
topsoil and reseeding, would total approximately $8,820.00,
substantially more than the damages awarded by the court.
Under similar circumstances, the Colorado Supreme
Court, in Bobrick v. Taylor, 467 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1970),
held that the cost of replacement of soil was an appropriate
measure of damages in a trespass action, notwithstanding
the claim of defendant contractor that the proper measure
of damages would be the difference in market value of the
land before and after the alleged trespass.

See also

Engler v. Hatch, 472 P.2d 680 (Colo. App. 1970), in which
the court allowed damages of $1,000.00 based upon cost of
reseeding and restoration cost following a trespass, although plaintiff failed to prove that the market value of
his land was in any way diminished by the trespass.

By

refusing to award damages on the basis of restoration cost,
the trial court in the instant case showed considerable
leniency toward appellants.
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The court also showed some kindness in refusing
to award punitive damages to Williams for Carter's willful
and malicious destruction of property.

The evidence

clearly shows that Carter understood Williams' claim to
the area now in dispute and acknowledged Williams' ownershi;
long before he employed Canto to grade the property:

On at

least two occasions, he offered to buy the property from
Williams (Tr. 93, 309, 315); he saw Williams use the

dispu~

area for a family reunion (Tr. 318); and he ran a line of
trailer hookups precisely along the eastern Skyline boundary, as described in the deed (Tr. 18, 315) .

Nonetheless,

utterly disregarding Williams' ownership right, he graded
the property, ruining it and causing a long-drawn litigation which has prevented Williams from putting the property to profitable use.
These circumstances fit all the criteria for an award
of punitive damages, as discussed by the Utah Supreme Court
in Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (Utah 1975):
In considering the problem of punitive damages
and the arguments thereon, it is well to have
in mind the purposes of punitive damages. They
are: a punishment of the defendant for particularly grievous injury caused by conduct which
is not only wrongful, but which is wilful and
malicious so that .
. mere recompense for actual
loss is inadequate . . . , and also that such a
verdict should serve as a wholesome warning to
others.
In Kesler, the defendant claimed land and cattle under an
instrument which erroneously conveyed more than was in-
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tended.

The defendant gained knowledge of the error, yet

persisted in claiming the land and cattle.

At trial, the

plaintiff was awarded $25,000.00 actual damages and
$10,000.00 punitive damages.

On appeal, the judgment was

affirmed with a reduction of $5,000.00 in punitive damages,
the court considering it pertinent to affirmance that defendant's malicious conduct had caused a long and vexatious
litigation, during the course of which plaintiff was deprived of his rightful property.
The evidence in the instant case forces the conclusion that Carter's conduct was equally outrageous as that
decried in Kesler.

At best, Carter was consciously

indifferent to plaintiff's rights and to the consequences
of grading plaintiff's property, such gross negligence
calling for an award of exemplary damages, 22 Arn. Jur. 2d,
Damages, §§ 249, 252 (1965).

At worst, Carter acted wan-

tonly and maliciously.
Despite the foregoing statements concerning restoration cost and punitive damages, respondent Williams intends
to abide by the trial court's judgment, which represents a
just and equitable resolution of the parties' dispute.
CONCLUSION
The decision and judgment of the trial court, quieting
title to the disputed property in respondent Williams and
awarding him damages arising out of the trespass and des-
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truction of his land, are amply supported by competent
evidence.

Conversely, appellants have failed to demonstra-

reversible error by the trial court with regard to any
of their contentions.

They have failed to meet their burdi

of proof respecting deed reformation and acquisition of
property by acquiescence, and they have failed to justify
their lack of rebuttal evidence concerning damages.
The trial court's decision and judgment merit affirmance in every respect.
Respectfully submitted,

William G. Fowler
William G. Marsden
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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